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Abstract The aim of this paper is to present and discuss main philosophical ideas
concerning logic and mathematics of a significant but forgotten Polish philosopher
Benedykt Bornstein. He received his doctoral degree with Kazimierz Twardowski
but is not included into the Lvov–Warsaw School of Philosophy founded by the
latter. His philosophical views were unique and quite different from the views of
main representatives of Lvov–Warsaw School. We shall discuss Bornstein’s con-
siderations on the philosophy of geometry, on the infinity, on the foundations of set
theory and his polemics with Stanisław Les´niewski as well as his conception of a
geometrization of logic, of the categorial logic and of the mathematics of quality.
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Benedykt Bornstein was a significant Polish philosopher who now is almost
completely forgotten. Although he wrote his doctoral dissertation under the
supervision of Kazimierz Twardowski, the founder of the famous Lvov–Warsaw
School of Philosophy,1 he was not a member of this school—mainly because of his
metaphysical views. In some way he was an individualist; his research did not
follow the main trend.
Bornstein was born in Warsaw on 31 January 1880. He studied in Warsaw and
Berlin. In 1907, he received his doctoral degree at the University of Lvov under the
supervision of Kazimierz Twardowski. From 1915 he lectured on logic, epistemol-
ogy and ontology within the framework of the Warsaw Society of Science Courses
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and from 1918 in the Free Polish University (Polish: Wolna Wszechnica Polska).
From 1928 he also worked in the Ło´dz´ branch of the Free Polish University. After
World War II he held the Chair of Logic and Ontology at the University of Ło´dz´. He
died suddenly after a surgery in Ło´dz´ on 11 November 1948.
Bornstein’s scientific interests were on the border of philosophy and mathemat-
ics. His conceptions did not win recognition and greater interest of his contem-
poraries. He worked in relative isolation although he participated in philosophical
congresses and published his works in the major periodicals both in Poland (such as
Przegla˛d Filozoficzny, Wiedza i _Zycie, Przegla˛d Klasyczny) and abroad. His
scientific activities can be divided into three periods: in the first one he translated
Kant’s works and developed his ideas in a critical way; the second period was
dedicated to investigations concerning the philosophy of mathematics, and the third
period—to problems of metaphysics cultivated in the spirit of the classical trend.
His works written in the second period raised some interest of Polish philosophers.
His investigations concerning the philosophy of mathematics led to the formulation
of a new philosophical method in the form of categorial geometrical logic. The
theme of this paper makes us focus on the latter investigations.
Let us begin by discussing Bornstein’s reflections on the philosophy of geometry.
Here Bornstein referred to Kant’s transcendental aesthetics and Twardowski’s
theory of images and concepts (cf. his 1894). At the same time, he criticised the idea
of constructing geometry on the basis of set theory or topology; he also distanced
himself from Poincare´’s conventionalism. In his opinion, constructing a geometry
should be begun by constructing proper geometrical concepts, which have their
objective references. In his book Prolegomena filozoficzne do geometryi [Philo-
sophical Prolegomena to Geometry] (1912) he distinguished between the image of
physical space and the concept of geometrical space, and he followed the idea that
the so-called background image must be an image the object of which exists and is
truly perceived, which is to guarantee that the common features of the object of the
concept of geometrical space and the object of the background image will not only
concern the world of objective images but also be grounded in the experiential
reality.2 According to Bornstein, one of the common features of both objects is
three-dimensionality. He wrote in Prolegomena filozoficzne do geometryi:
2 It is worth mentioning here Les´niewski’s ideas concerning the distinction between objects and
concepts. The reason is that both Les´niewski and Bornstein were students of Twardowski, so they came
from the same philosophical school. Below we shall present the discussion between Les´niewski and
Bornstein dealing with the foundations of set theory. It is the other reason to consider Lesniewski’s ideas.
Les´niewski spoke not about concepts but abort names (in particular abort general names) and about
individual objects that could be of arbitrary nature. Further one should distinguish object in his ontology
(it was in fact a calculus of names) and in his mereology (that was the theory of sets in the collective
sense). According to Les´niewski a name is any expression which can play a role of B in sentences of the
form ‘‘a is B’’. Hence Les´niewski proposed in his ontology a theory of names of one category only and
liquidated the dualism of nominal expressions (individual names vs. general names). He did not say
anything on the nature of objects that exist except that they are individual objects. His ontology is
‘‘metaphysically’’ neutral—it cannot be deduced from its theses whether anything does exist and what
does exist. He says only that A exists if and only if for some x, x is A, and that A is an object if and only if
for some x, A is x. Add that on Les´niewski’s ontology were founded ontological considerations of
Tadeusz Kotarbin´ski. His conception is called reism—it is claimed in it that individual objects are things
and that only they do exist.
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If we analyse this image with respect to spatiality we will be always convinced
that its object is three-dimensional, i.e. it has length, width and height (or
depth); that from each of its points we can draw three perpendicular lines,
belonging to the given object in some space. This objective spatiality,
characterising three-dimensionality, is a common feature of our background
image and the object of the concept of geometrical space, based on that image
(1912, p. 8).3
Three-dimensionality is determined by experience and is not—as Poincare´
claimed—a separate mental construction.4
As far as the question of the choice between Euclidean and non-Euclidean
geometries is concerned, Bornstein thought that:
From the purely logical or analytical point of view the theorems or formulas of
non-Euclidean geometry contain no contradictions, and it is logically possible
that they are equally eligible as the theorems and formulas of Euclidean
geometry (1912, p. 89).5
At the same time, experience cannot help us choose one, true and correct geometry.
Bornstein wrote in Prolegomena:
If now the followers of the purely logical or analytical concept of geometry
turn to experience with the question which of the three logically possible
systems of theorems is important to experience and is confirmed by it, they
must be prepared not to receive any answer to their question. […] In other
words, when we turn to experience to show us which of the possible logical
systems is confirmed by it, which is true, then experience will never give us
any answer since its data will present a constant in the equation with two
unknowns (one geometrical and the other physical), and so they will be
insufficient to solve precisely this geometrical unknown in the equation (1912,
pp. 89–90).6
3 ‘Je _zeli zanalizujemy takie wyobra _zenie pod wzgle˛dem przestrzennos´ci przekonamy sie˛ zawsze, _ze
przedmiot jego jest tro´jwymiarowy, t.j. _ze posiada długos´c´, szerokos´c´ i wysokos´c´ (wzgle˛dnie głe˛bokos´c´),
_ze w ka _zdym jego punkcie mo _zna poprowadzic´ trzy prostopadłe linie, nale _za˛ce na pewnej przestrzeni do
danego przedmiotu. Ta przestrzennos´c´ przedmiotowa, kto´ra˛ charakteryzuje tro´jwymiarowos´c´, jest cecha˛
wspo´lna˛ przedmiotu naszego wyobra _zenia podkładowego i przedmiotu poje˛cia przestrzeni geomet-
rycznej, opartego na tem wyobra _zeniu.’
4 For the particular remarks on Bernstein’s views concerning the problem of essence and structure of
geometrical space see S´lezin´ski (2009).
5 ‘Z punktu widzenia czysto logicznego lub czysto analitycznego twierdzenia lub formuły geometryi
nieeuklidesowej nie zawieraja˛ sprzecznos´ci, a logicznie mo _zliwe, sa˛ ro´wnie uprawnione, jak twierdzenia i
formuły geometryi euklidesowej.’
6 ‘Je _zeli teraz zwolennicy czysto logicznego lub czysto analitycznego pojmowania geometryi zwro´ca˛ sie˛
do dos´wiadczenia z pytaniem, kto´ry z trzech logicznie mo _zliwych systemo´w twierdzen´ jest wa _zny dla
dos´wiadczenia i znajduje w niem potwierdzenie, to musza˛ byc´ przygotowani na to, _ze odpowiedzi na to
pytanie nie otrzymaja˛. […] Słowem, gdy zwracamy sie˛ do dos´wiadczenia, by nam wskazało, kto´ry z
mo _zliwych logicznie systemo´w znajduje w niem potwierdzenie, kto´ry jest prawdziwy, to dos´wiadczenie
na to pytanie nigdy nie be˛dzie mogło dac´ nam odpowiedzi, gdy_z jego dane be˛da˛ przedstawiały wielkos´c´
stała˛ w ro´wnaniu z dwiema niewiadomymi (jedna˛ geometryczna˛, druga˛ fizyczna˛), a wie˛c be˛da˛
niedostateczne do s´cisłego rozwia˛zania tego ro´wnania co do niewiadomej geometrycznej.’
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Bornstein claimed that real spatial extensiveness could not be identified with the
extensiveness defined by the continuum of real numbers. The latter has no space
character. Therefore, the attempts to transfer theorems from one domain to the other
are not justified. In particular, one cannot assume a priori that a geometrical line
does not correspond to any continuous function. In his article ‘Problemat istnienia
linji geometrycznych’ [The Problem of the Existence of Geometrical Lines] (1913)
he showed that such lines corresponded to some solid functions and did not
correspond to other ones. Assuming that all geometrical curves have tangents we
have the result that only functions with derivatives correspond to them.
Consequently, if every movement must have speed, and speed is the derivative of
distance with respect to time, movement cannot occur along curves without
tangents. Thus not all functions are of geometrical character, in particular it
concerns those functions that have no derivatives.
Bornstein also dealt with the problem of infinity. In his opinion an infinite set can
be given only as a certain whole embracing infinitely many elements. At the same
time, the actual infinity is never given as the infinity of its particular elements—only
a finite number of them can actually be given.7 Thus, a question arises whether all
elements of an infinite set (in the sense of actual infinity) exist physically or whether
they exist in themselves independently from their actualisation. Bornstein examined
these questions in his book Elementy filozofii jako nauki s´cisłej [Elements of
Philosophy as an Exact Science] (1916) asking whether an actual segment is a set of
potential or actual points. He concluded that an infinite set of points situated
between two points of a geometrical line existed physically in nature but not all of
its elements necessarily did.
Thus we come to Bornstein’s considerations on the foundations of set theory. We
must above all mention his work ‘Podstawy filozoficzne teorji mnogos´ci’ [The
Philosophical Foundations of Set Theory] (1914). This work was criticised by
Stanisław Les´niewski in his article ‘Teorja mnogos´ci na ‘‘podstawach fil-
ozoficznych’’ Benedykta Bornsteina’ [Set Theory on the ‘Philosophical Founda-
tions’ of Benedykt Bornstein] (1914). In turn Bornstein wrote an article ‘W sprawie
recenzji p. Stanisława Les´niewskiego rozprawy mojej pt. ‘‘Podstawy filozoficzne
teorji mnogos´ci’’’ [On Mr Stanisław Les´niewski’s Review of My Dissertation ‘The
Philosophical Foundations of Set Theory’] (1915). Thus the polemic ended.
We cannot discuss here the technical details of the polemic and more, the
polemic did not bring about any effects. However, some arguments of both thinkers
are worth mentioning.
Let us begin by stating that in his work (1914) Bornstein notices that the source
of antinomy in set theory is its erroneous philosophical justification. He concludes
that a set of individually existing elements can be only finite. In addition, he bases
his thesis concerning the existence of finite and infinite sets having individually
existing elements on the following three lemmata (cf. 1914, pp. 183–185):
• The same number corresponds to two equivalent sets with individually existing
elements,
7 Observe that Bornstein’s idea of an infinite set is not identical with Cantor’s one. Cantor—following
Platonizm—did not distinguish between existing and actually given elements.
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• in a set of elements, existing individually, the same number cannot correspond
to the proper part of this set in the same way as to the whole,
• a set of elements, existing individually, cannot be equivalent to its own part.
He explains the used terms in the following way:
If a plurality of elements, each existing individually, i.e. as a different unit, is
analysed only as a plurality of units, we analyse it from the point of view of
quantity; at the same time, this plurality of units constitutes the quantity,
relatively, its number of individually existing elements of the given plurality.
[…] between the plurality of elements, existing individually, and the plurality
of units, constituting its quantity, relatively its number, there is one–one
correspondence; these pluralities are, as we say, equivalent or of equal power.
[…] since quantity is a real feature of the plurality of elements, existing
individually, whereas the number is a notional equivalent of this feature (1914,
p. 183).8
Omitting the technical details of Bornstein’s reasoning we must say that he made
the error of quaternio terminorum, i.e. the use of the same term in two different
meanings—in this case it is the term ‘the same number.’
Assuming the existence of an infinite set of natural numbers Bornstein shows the
essential nature of infinite pluralities. Now, in the infinite plurality of natural
numbers only their finite quantity—in his opinion—can be considered individually.
Therefore, there can be infinite pluralities without any possibile individual content.
He writes:
[…] here we have a perfect example, showing the essential nature of infinite
pluralities, consisting in their full independence from the matters of
actualising (individualising, materialising) the elements of plurality. Here
we have an example of a pure form in ideal perfectness (1914, p. 190).9
He also concludes that the well-ordering theorem (equivalent to the axiom of
choice) ‘applying in general to all kinds of plurality is wrong; whereas applying to
the plurality of elements, existing individually, physically, is an obvious truth’
(Bornstein 1914, p. 190).10
Les´niewski began his criticism of Bornstein’s work (1914) with the following
words:
8 ‘Je _zeli mnogos´c´ elemento´w, z kto´rych ka _zdy istnieje indywidualnie, tj. jako ro´ _zna od innych jednostka,
rozpatrujemy tylko jako mnogos´c´ jednostek, to rozpatrujemy ja˛ z punktu widzenia ilos´ci, przy czym ta
mnogos´c´ jednostek stanowi włas´nie ilos´c´, wzgle˛dnie liczbe˛ istnieja˛cych indywidualnie elemento´w danej
mnogos´ci. […] miedzy mnogos´cia˛ elemento´w, istnieja˛cych indywidualnie, a mnogos´cia˛ jednostek,
stanowia˛ca˛ jej ilos´c´, wzgle˛dnie liczbe˛, istnieje odpowiednios´c´ jedno-jednoznaczna; mnogos´ci te sa˛, jak
mo´wimy, ro´wnowa _zne lub ro´wnej mocy. […] ilos´c´ bowiem jest cecha˛ rzeczywista˛ mnogos´ci elemento´w
istnieja˛cych indywidualnie, liczba zas´ jest odpowiednikiem poje˛ciowym tej cechy.’ .
9 ‘[…] mamy tu doskonały przykład, wykazuja˛cy istotna˛ nature˛ mnogos´ci nieskon´czonych, polegaja˛ca˛
na ich zupełnej niezale _znos´ci od spraw zaktualizowania (zindywidualizowania, zmaterializowania)
elemento´w mnogos´ci. Mamy tu przykład czystej formy w idealnej doskonałos´ci.’
10 ‘w zastosowaniu do wszelkiej mnogos´ci w ogo´le jest błe˛dne; w zastosowaniu natomiast do mnogos´ci
elemento´w, istnieja˛cych indywidualnie, aktualnie, jest prawda˛ oczywista˛.’
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Dr Benedykt Bornstein wrote a treatise in which he tried to provide set theory
with ‘philosophical foundations’; he thought that certain contradictions, which
can be seen in set theory, are not caused by set theory but by its wrong
philosophical justification, and this view of the problems, prevailing in set
theory, must have been the origin of the author’s desire to add to this science
some thoughts, which could justify it ‘philosophically’ (Bornstein 1914,
p. 488).11
Further, Les´niewski analyses Bornstein’s formal argumentations—ignoring the
ontological questions, which were so important to the latter. In particular,
Les´niewski criticises Bornstein’s terms ‘existing individually’ and ‘existing
formally,’ accusing him of not giving any precise definition of the concept of
‘unit.’ In addition, he proposes to replace the term ‘unit’ by the term ‘object,’ which,
however, as seen in Bornstein’s response (1915) does not satisfy the latter.
Les´niewski also criticises Bornstein’s interpretation of Zermelo’s well-ordering
theorem.
Avoiding any complicated (and devoid of deeper meaning now) technical
questions concerning the polemic between Les´niewski and Bornstein it would be
sufficient to say that their levels of discourse were entirely different. Les´niewski
defended the standard approach towards set theory (which he then refuted for the
cause of mereology) against Bornstein’s criticism flowing from philosophical
motives. As S´lezin´ski (2010) notices ‘for Les´niewski the formal analyses are binding
whereas for Bornstein the argumentations, apart from formal correctness, must refer to
the objective layer of the problems under consideration’ (p. 110).12 Les´niewski
summarised his critical review of Bornstein’s words in the following way:
The work of Mr Bornstein has no value for the ‘foundations’ of set theory. It
does not remove any ‘contradictions’ from set theory as Mr Bornstein seems
to be claiming; on the contrary, he creates them to a much bigger extent; he
does not justify them ‘philosophically’ and in no other way does he justify
even one theorem of set theory; since one cannot justify something with the
help of ‘definitions’ and ‘lemmata’ that are full of errors and contradictions; he
explains nothing because the seemingly devised conceptions of something, for
example the conception of ‘capacity,’ are inconsistent and unclear (1914,
p. 507).13
11 ‘Dr Benedykt Bornstein napisał rozprawe˛, w kto´rej starał sie˛ zaopatrzyc´ teorie˛ mnogos´ci w ,,podstawy
filozoficzne’’; uwa _zał on, i _z do pewnych sprzecznos´ci, kto´re daja˛ sie˛ widziec´ w teorii mnogos´ci, prowadzi
nie sama teoria mnogos´ci, lecz błe˛dne jej uzasadnienie filozoficzne, a pogla˛d taki na stan rzeczy, panuja˛cy
w teorii mnogos´ci, stanowił włas´nie zapewne geneze˛ pragnienia autora, by przysporzyc´ tej nauce troche˛
mys´li, kto´re by ja˛ mogły ,,filozoficznie’’ uzasadnic´.’
12 ‘dla Les´niewskiego wia˛ _za˛ce sa˛ analizy formalne, a dla Bornsteina rozumowania, opro´cz poprawnos´ci
formalnej, musza˛ odnosic´ sie˛ do warstwy przedmiotowej badanych problemo´w naukowych.’
13 ‘Praca p. Bornsteina nie ma _zadnej w ogo´le wartos´ci dla ,,podstaw’’ teorii mnogos´ci. Nie usuwa ona
_zadnych ,,sprzecznos´ci’’ z teorii mnogos´ci, jak sie˛ to zdaje p. Bornsteinowi, lecz je przeciwnie w wielkiej
obfitos´ci stwarza; nie uzasadnia ,,filozoficznie’’ ani te _z w _zaden inny sposo´b ani jednego twierdzenia
teorii mnogos´ci, nie mo _zna bowiem uzasadnic´ czegos´ za pomoca˛ ,,definicji’’ i ,,lemato´w’’, pełnych
błe˛do´w i sprzecznos´ci; nie wyjas´nia nic, bo obmys´lone niby czegos´ koncepcje, jak np. koncepcje
,,pojemnos´ci’’, sa˛ sprzeczne i niejasne.’
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In his response (Bornstein 1915) to Les´niewski’s criticism Bornstein tried to
specify his conception of set theory. He also saw certain inconsistencies in
Les´niewski’s arguments. He was not convinced about the validity of the accusations
and concluded his answer:
Facing the foregoing arguments it seems to me that I will be impartial
responding to Mr Les´niewski’s review: primo—it does not show, even to the
slightest extent, any contradictions which are to be stuck in the concepts I have
used, and secundo—it is an example of Mr Les´niewski’s extremely careless
disregard of the elementary principles of logic (Bornstein 1915,
pp. 139–140).14
As we have seen both debaters remained on different planes. Les´niewski
conducted his argumentation and analyses in the spirit preferred by the Lvov–
Warsaw School, i.e. using the apparatus of mathematical logic and focusing on
formal matters, whereas Bornstein favoured ontological questions and worked in the
spirit of the concept of the mathematics of quality, which he was developing
himself. In particular, the latter might have been the reason why there were no
polemics (except the one held by Les´niewski) with Bornstein’s later works—in fact,
the concept of the mathematics of quality was so different from the universally
accepted tendencies and styles of thinking that it was difficult to find any common
points. On the other hand, Bornstein criticised the widespread practice of treating
mathematics as the science on quantity and magnitude, number and measure—in his
opinion there is also qualitative mathematics, especially qualitative algebra or
geometry. This qualitative mathematics deals not only with order, in particular with
order between qualities. It should serve a mathematization of the philosophy and the
construction of a qualitative-mathematical model of the world. Let us add that
details of Bornstein’s attempts to develop the qualitative mathematics are not quite
clear.
Let us proceed to the next idea of Bornstein, namely, his conception of the
geometrisation of logic, i.e. geometrical logic. Referring to Leibniz, who was
always closer to the intensional than the extensional conception of logical forms and
who wanted to construct logic based on the content of expressions and not only on
the extensions of concepts, Bornstein tried to create a new logic—namely the logic
of content. Since he thought that the content of a concept sets out its extension, and
thus the exactness and definiteness of the content determine the precision and
definiteness of the extensions and in general, of the classes.
Bornstein divided concepts and judgements into those which were set out
objectively and those which were set out logically. The former parallel objects in
reality and the latter gain their meaning through definitions. In addition, Bornstein
distinguishes between nominal and real definitions. In nominal definitions the
definiendum as if synthetises the essence of words constituting the definiens. In real
definitions we have the reverse process—the definiendum is divided into a
14 ‘Wobec powy _zszego wydaje mi sie˛, _ze be˛de˛ obiektywnym, gdy o recenzji w mowie be˛da˛cej p.
Les´niewskiego powiem: primo— _ze w najmniejszym nawet stopniu nie wykazuje sprzecznos´ci, tkwic´
maja˛cych w u _zywanych przeze mnie poje˛ciach, i secundo— _ze jest przykładem niebywale lekkomys´lnego
nieliczenia sie˛ p. Les´niewskiego z elementarnymi zasadami logiki.’
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combination of simpler constituents occurring in the definiens. However, both types
of definition are definitions per genus proximum et differentiam specificam.
Likewise, we have judgements set out objectively and judgements set out logically.
At the same time, Bornstein assumes that all judgements have subject-predicative
structures.
Bornstein, following the conceptions of Edward Vermilye Huntington (1904),
proposed his own system of the algebra of logic, which he formulated as categorial.
He accepted three logical operators: negation, addition and multiplication. Addition
consists in integrating the contents of concepts whereas multiplication sets out the
biggest common element of concepts. Here two constants appear: 0 and 1, where 0
is the lower bound of any content and 1 is the upper bound of any content. Element
0 has the weakest logical content since when added to any element it does not
change the content of it. Element 0 expresses the content of the concept of
‘something’ or ‘the object in general’ whereas element 1 presents the substantially
strongest concept, concept with the richest content, ‘whole’ and ‘everythingness.’
The element 1 is the upper limit of all concepts whereas 0 is the lower limit of all
concepts. Moreover, there is a relation of the subordinance of content marked as\,
but it does not have the property of connectedness.
Furthermore, Bornstein tried to give a geometrical interpretation to his categorial
logic of content.15 His first attempts can be found in ‘Zarys architektoniki i
geometrji s´wiata logicznego’ [Outline of Architectonics and Geometry of the
Logical World] (Bornstein 1922), and then in his more mature work ‘Geometrja
logiki kategorialnej i jej znaczenie dla filozofii’ [Geometry of Categorial Logic and
Its Importance for Philosophy] (Bornstein 1926).16 However, we cannot get
entangled in complicated (and not always clear) technical details. Suffice it to say
that Bornstein refers to projective geometry stressing its qualitative character. He
shows the structure of his logic of content through various diagrams, both two-
dimensional and three-dimensional. Thus he refers to the works of the previous
authors who used a geometrical exposition of certain logical dependencies, for
example Euler’s wheels, the diagrams of Venn and Haase or certain conceptions of
Leibniz, Peirce and Grassmann.
The analyses on logic and the use of geometrical interpretations led Bornstein to
the conclusion that both domains could be linked and thus a qualitative-categorial
geometrical logic could be created. This logic can help us discover and reveal the
universal structures of reality. In his work La logique ge´ome´trique et sa porte´e
philosophique [Geometrical Logic and Its Meaning for Philosophy] (Bornstein
1928) he tried to show the similarity of the domain of thought and the domain of
space objects. He tried to unite both of his systems: algebraic logic and geometrical
logic in one system called topologic (Polish: topologika).
Bornstein’s system of qualitative-categorial geometrical logic is not quite clear—
therefore we cannot go into details. Let us say only that he used in his system some
ideas of projective geometry. He considered two-dimensional and three-dimensional
15 Add that the adjective ‘‘categorial’’ means here something else than in Ajdukiewicz’ ,,categorial
grammar’’. .
16 Cf. also his unpublished works (a), (b) and (c).
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categorial logic. The two-dimensional logico-geometrical space was spread by him
on two categories: genus proximus and differentia specifica whereas the three-
dimensional one on those two categories and additionally on the category of
individualization (individual determination).
Bornstein generalised his system of logic as a dialectical geometrical logic and
presented it in his unpublished work Zarys teorii logiki dialektycznej [Outline of the
Theory of Dialectical Logic] (Bornstein 1946). Unfortunately his explanations were
not clear enough. It should be stressed that he assumed the possibility of various
degrees of dialecticality and consequently, various kinds of dialectical logics. In his
opinion traditional logic is the least dialectical one whereas mathematical logic is
partially-dialectical. In the quoted work he wanted to show that dialectical logic
could be treated in a mathematical way, could be axiomatized and given a
geometrical interpretation. However, the problem of the consistency of dialectical
logic appeared. The need to show consistency was very essential and more, this
logic was to help examine the real world. The sought-after proof of consistency
would refute the accusation of the irrationality of this logic. Unfortunately,
Bornstein did not give such a proof—he gave only certain arguments supporting
consistency but they were disputable.
Bornstein’s considerations were based on his conviction that there existed a
harmony between the world of non-spatial thoughts and the world of spatial beings.
He thought that mathematics and the logic of quality were objectively grounded in
the real world. At the same time, he treated mathematics as an auxiliary domain of
philosophy. Bornstein wanted to construct a philosophical system using mathemat-
ical concepts. He thought after certain universal structures and principles of the real
world; besides the quantitative aspect he looked for the qualitative aspect. In his
opinion the order of the world concerns both of these aspects. Thus he spoke about
the mathematics of quantity and the mathematics of quality. Mathematics is not only
the science of quantity and measure but of order, in particular the order between
qualities. For Bornstein metrical geometry was an example of the mathematics of
quantity whereas projective geometry—the mathematics of quality. Philosophy
should look for the qualitative structures of the world—its starting point should be
qualitative mathematical logic.
Bornstein’s conceptions did not win recognition and acceptance of his
contemporaries. The reasons for this included the lack of clarity and precision of
his ideas. Moreover, they were not completely worked out. Bornstein’s investiga-
tions did not follow the main trend of research. The mathematical and logical tools
he constructed were to create a metaphysical system and not to serve analyses,
which was decidedly different from the style of philosophy accepted and developed
in the Lvov–Warsaw School.
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